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APPELLANTS1 BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property damage
brought by the driver of an automobile, Sylvia Keller, and a
passenger, Lottie Draper, when the automobile they were in was
struck in the rear by a vehicle driven by the defendant, Dwight
Shelley, on December 31, 1973.

It is claimed that the defendant,

Dwight Shelley, was negligent in the manner in which he operated
his vehicle.

The defendant denies that he was negligent.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

The trial court submitted the issue of negligence and damages to the jury.

The jury found that the defendant was not

negligent, but nonetheless, awarded damages to the plaintiff and
third-party defendant.

The trial court, in interpreting the ver-

dict, entered judgment in favor of the defendant and against

the plaintiff, no cause of action.
The trial court denied the plaintiff and third-party defendant's motion for a directed verdict and motion for a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the trial court
reversed and have the case remanded to the trial court with an
order to enter a directed verdict in favor of the appellants, or,
in the alternative, to set aside the judgment and grant a new
trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts in this case are fairly simple.

On the afternoon

of December 31, 1973, the appellants traveled from their home in
Sanpete County to the Provo area for the purpose of going to dinner with friends and family.

(Transcript "T." 44)

Early in the

evening, the appellants drove south from Provo to Springville on
State Road No. 8, a four-lane highway with two lanes of traffic
in each direction.

(Exhibit 19)

They intended to spend the even-

ing at the Sage Inn Motel located at the north end of Springville.
They were traveling in the inside lane of traffic and as they
neared the Sage Inn, they reduced their speed, activated the left
turn signal and came to a stop, waiting for oncoming traffic to
clear so they could turn left into the parking lot of the Inn.
(T. 44)

While waiting for the oncoming traffic to clear, appel-

lants were struck from the rear by respondent's automobile.
The respondent worked in Provo and lived in Springville.

At

the scene of the accident, he told appellants that he had been in
a hurry to get home from work that night.

(T. 131)

He was travel-

ing south on State Road No. 8 in the outside lane of traffic at
-2-

approximately 40 m.p.h.

(T. 166)

He was closely following

another vehicle waiting to clear the intersection he was approaching so that he could change to the faster inside lane*

(T. 174)

Once through the intersection, respondent changed to the inside
lane and accelerated to between 50 and 55 m.p.h.

(T. 170, 174)

He then saw appellants waiting to make their left turn, slammed
on his brakes and struck the appellants from the rear.

(T. 167)

The force of the impact was so great that it ripped the front
seat of appellants1 car out of the floor, shearing off the bolts
which fastened the seat to the floor.

(T. 40, Exhibit 7)

lants1 car came to rest 286 f 5" from the point of impact.

Appel(T. 39,

Exhibit 19)
At the scene of the accident and for some distance in either
direction, the highway is straight and level.
road was dry and the weather was clear.

(Exhibit 19)

(T. 14)

The

Respondent does

not recall ever looking ahead in the lane to which he changed.
(T. 173)

There is uncontroverted testimony that appellants had

their lights on and left turn signal flashing.

(T. 45)

The

accident occurred at 6:20 p.m., and while it was dusk, it was
not completely dark.

(T. 165)

There were street lights all

around illuminating the point of impact and surrounding areas.
(T. 174)

There is a street light next to the point of impact.

(T. 16)

In addition, there were lights from a construction yard

next to the accident scene which provided further light.
17)

(T. 16,

Respondent testified that the distance from the point of

impact in front of the Sage Inn to the intersection that he was
waiting to get through so he could change lanes was 1/3 mile.
173)

An investigating officer measured it by his patrol car as
-3-

(T.

1/3 mile.

(T. 16)

There is a conflict in the testimony as to

the exact distance from the point of impact to the place where
respondent changed lanes.

The highway patrolman investigating

the accident, Officer Nusink, testified that when making out the
accident report, the respondent told him he made the lane change
approximately at the V.F.W. Club, a point just before the intersection in question, a distance of 1/3 mile.

(T. 78)

In his

deposition, respondent testified that he made his lane change
just after the intersection.

(T. 174)

During the trial, respon-

dent testified at one point that he made the lane change about
two blocks from where he struck appellants from the rear.
172)

(T.

At another point in the testimony, he said he thought he

had about three times the length of the skid marks from the point
he changed lanes to the point of impact.

(T. 172)

His skid

marks were 96 ! 8 !l , so he had, at the very least, 290' to see
the appellants and stop or avoid them.

(Exhibit 19)

POINT I
RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW IN FAILING TO
KEEP A PROPER LOOKOUT AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
APPELLANTS1 MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.
At the close of respondent's case in the lower court, appellants made a motion for a directed verdict that the respondent
was negligent as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout.

The motion was denied by the Court and the issue was sub-

mitted to the jury.

(T. 179, 180)

It has long been established in Utah that a motorist must
keep a proper lookout for vehicles and objects in the roadway
ahead of him, and he must operate his vehicle in such a manner as
-4-

to avoid striking such objects as could be seen by an ordinarily
observant person.

Indeed, this Court has regularly held that if

it is clear that a motorist failed to see what he should have
seen, and such failure caused him to strike or hit another vehicle
or object, such failure may be negligence as a matter of law.
In Dalley v. Midwestern Dairy Products, 80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d
309 (1932), a motorist approaching from the rear was held to be
negligent as a matter of law for failing to see a truck in time
to avoid hitting it*

In spite of the fact that the collision

occurred at night, the truck was parked illegally in the roadway,
and the truck had.no tail lights, the court found that the approaching motorist should have seen the truck in time to avoid
a collision and was negligent as a matter of law for failing to
do so.

The Court emphasized that the highway was straight and

level, the truck was directly in front of him, and there was
nothing to obstruct his view.

In affirming an order granting

summary judgment, this court said:
In such a case it must inevitably follow
that [the motorist] did not keep a lookout
ahead, or, if he did, he either did not heed
what he saw or he could not see the truck because his lights were not such as were prescribed by law. . . It follows that his failure to discover the truck sooner was a proximate cause of the accident and resulting
injury. Dalley, supra, 311-12.
The Dalley case has been critized as being too broad.

Cri-

tics feared that the language of the case, if given full effect,
would require a court to find negligence as a matter of lav; every
time a motorist struck an object he failed to see even if such
failure were not his fault.

(See, for example, the dissent of

Justice Wolfe in Hansen v. Clyde, 89 Utah 31, 56 P.2d 1366 at
-5-

;

1371.)

Such fears have not been realized, however*

In Nielsen

v. Watanobe, 90 Utah 401, 62 P.2d 117, this Court held that a
motorist did not breach his duty to keep a proper lookout when he
was blinded by oncoming headlights*

But this Court has uniformly

upheld the Dalley doctrine when the facts show that the driver
failed to keep a proper lookout to avoid a collision.
In Hirschbach v. Dubuque Packing Co,, 7 Utah 2d 7, 216 P.2d
319 (1957)/ this Court again held that it was negligence as a
matter of law for a motorist approaching from the rear to fail to
see a truck stopped in the roadway in time to avoid hitting it.
The Court emphasized that even though the truck was stopped in
the middle of the road at night, the motorist approaching from
the rear failed to see what he should have seen, or if he did
see the truck, then he failed to act to avoid a collision.
The lower court granted the summary judgment on the ground that under the rule announced in Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co.,
80 Utah 331, 15 P.2d 309, appellant's driver
was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident as a matter of law because he was driving in such a manner that he
failed to stop or act to avoid the collision
within the distance the law requires his lights
to show substantial objects in front of him.
We agree. Hirschbach, supra, at 319.
The facts of the case now before the Court are very similar
to the facts in Dalley and Hirschbach.

In the instant case,

appellants were stopped in the left lane of traffic with their
lights on and left turn signal flashing, waiting for the oncoming traffic to clear so they could make a left turn, when they
were struck from behind by the respondent.
It is clear from respondent's testimony that he failed to
keep a proper lookout.

He testified that he did not remember
-6-

looking ahead before he changed lanes and after he changes lanes,
he had, at the very least, 300 feet in which to see appellants
and avoid striking them.

Respondent's breach of duty to see

what he should have seen is so clear from the record that the
Court below should have declared respondent negligent as a matter of law and granted appellants1 motion for a directed verdict.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING RESPONDENT"S INSTRUCTION
NUMBER SEVEN ON SUDDEN PERIL./
The trial court instructed the jury as follows:
When one is suddenly confronted by an
emergency not of his own making, consisting
of circumstances that call for immediate,
instinctive action, he is not required to
exercise the same degree of care that he
would be required to exercise had he time
for reflection. Under such circumstances
he is required to exercise such care as an
ordinary person would exercise when confronted by a like emergency under circumstances then existing. The rule of sudden
emergency cannot be invoked by a person
who brought the emergency upon himself by
his fault or did not use ordinary care to
avoid it. (R. 84)
In Solt v. Godfrey, 25 Utah 2d 210, 479 P.2d 474 (1971) ,

•

this Court held that it was reversible error to give a sudden
peril instruction when the facts were such that defendant had
failed to observe what he should have observed.

In that case,

the defendant failed to see a small child who was in plain view.
The roadway and shoulders were level*

There was no contention

that the child suddenly darted out.

The defendant simply fail-

ed to see what he should have seen.

Holding that in such a situa-

tion an instruction on sudden peril was reversible error, this
Court said:

-7-

Had there been evidence of a sudden or
unexpected situation arising without fault
on the part of the defendant, the instruction would be proper. However, in this case,
the sudden and unexpected situation arose
when the defendant saw what he should, have
seen all the time. One who is confronted
with an emergency occasioned by his own neglect is not entitled to have such an instruction given to the jury. It tends to
lead the jury to belief that the Court
thought there was a sudden emergency presented to a careful driver free from any
negligence. Solt, supra, at 477.
Last year, this Court stated in Wiscombe v. Cole, 30 Utah
2d

441, 519 P.2d 881, quoting from Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah

2d 392, 284 P.2d 1115, at 1117, 1118:

"The jury could have be-

lieved that the plaintiff created his own peril and thus was not
entitled to the benefits of 'sudden emergency1."

In the case at

bar, there was a great deal of evidence from which the jury could
have found the respondent created his own peril and thus he was
not entitled to the benefit of a "sudden emergency" instruction*
The record shows that the respondent changed from the outside
lane to the inside lane without first assuring himself that it
was safe to do so.

After he made his lane change, he continued

to increase his speed until he finally observed appellants in the
lane ahead of him waiting to make a left turn.

When he finally

observed them, he slammed on his brakes, but it was too late to
avoid violently striking appellants from the rear.
This was not a case of a suddenly-changing situatiion; appellants were simply waiting for the oncoming traffic to clear so
they could make their turn.

Respondent simply failed to observe

what was in front of him before it was too late.

The instruction

given "tend[ed] to lead the jury to believe that the Court thought
there was a sudden emergency presented to a careful driver free

-8-

from any negligence", and was, therefore, reversible error*

SoIt,

supra, at 477.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE ONE OF APPELLANTS r
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS, AND IN SO DOING, PREVENTED APPELLANTS1
THEORY OF THE CASE FROM GOING TO THE JURY.
The last two paragraphs of jury instruction number six as
given by the trial court are as follows:
Under the laws of this state on a multiple lane highway two single solid yellow
longitudinal lines four inches in width and
spaced in excess of two feet apart shall
constitute a distinctive roadway marking to
which no traffic shall travel to the left
thereof; however the use of such a distinctive roadway marking shall not be construed
to prohibit traffic movements across, and
where practical left turn movements must
commence from within such a distinctive
roadway marking.
Failure of a driver to operate his vehicle in accordance with the foregoing
requirements of law would constitute negligence on his part. (R. 83)
As instructed, the jury was told that

if the appellants failed

to commence their turn witnin the two yellow lines as described
in the instruction, they were negligent in failing to do so*
Appellants requested, but were denied, the following jury
instruction:
You are instructed that it is not negligence to disobey a traffic control device
if at the time the control device (highway
markings) was not sufficiently legible to be
seen by an ordinarily observant person. (R.
74)

•

The foregoing instruction is based on §41-6-23(b), U.C.A., 1953,
which provides in pertinent part that:
. . .no provision of this act for which official traffic-control devices are required,
~9-

shall be enforced against an alleged violator if at the time and place of the alleged
violation an official device is not in proper position and sufficiently legible to be
seen by an ordinarily observant person.
As can be seen by §41-6-23(b), it is not always true that
failure to act in accordance with road markings would be negligence as a matter of law.

If the markings were so difficult to

see that they were not legible to the ordinarily observant person, then failure to obey them would not constitute negligence.
There was considerable evidence that at the time of the
accident, the center of the roadway was covered with dirt and
cinders making the center lines illegible.

The driver of appel-

lants1 car testified that because of the extremely dirty condition of the road, she saw only the line closest to her lane of
traffic and not the other line ten feet to the left.
106)

(T. 45,

The passenger in appellants1 car also testified that the

center of the road was covered with dirt and cinders making the
center lines difficult to see.

(T. 148, 149)

Exhibit 2 is a

photograph of the road where the accident occurred, taken sometime
after the accident.

It shows a considerable amount of dirt and

cinders on the center portion of the highway.

Appellants testi-

fied that on the night of the accident there were considerably
more cinders and dirt than shown in the photograph.

(T. 107)

Considering the above testimony, and the fact that the accident
took place at night, the jury had a great deal of evidence from
which they could have concluded that the center lines were not
sufficiently legible for an ordinarily observant person to see,
and might have so concluded, had they been properly instructed.
The trial court's refusal to give the appellants1 requested in-10-

struction prejudiced the appellants1 case and denied them their
right to give the jury their theory of the case.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE EFFECT
THEIR ANSWERS WOULD HAVE ON THE FINAL OUTCOME OF THE CASE.
This.case was submitted to the jury in the form of a special
verdict/

After the jury retired to deliberate, they had consid-

erable difficulty with instruction 23, the special verdict instruction.

(T. 190-192,

R 90-91)

After some, discussion between the

attorneys and the Court, the jury was instructed as follows:
THE COURT: I believe I may know what your
trouble is. First I will read question number
six.
(Reading) "Without regard to any of
the previous questions and your answers
thereto, and in any event, state the
amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs Sylvia Keller and Lottie Draper as
a result of the occurrence."
Now ladies and gentlemen, in this case that
is now before the Court there is a body of law
governing it adopted by the legislature of this
State called collectively "comparative negligence". In a case of this sort the jury does
not award anyone anything. The jury answers
certain questions of fact and then the Court
as a matter of law applies certain formula,
depending on the answers, and determines if
and in what amount anyone is awarded anything.
So that your verdict as such does not constitute an award. It constitutes a factual determination. It answers certain questions of
fact which are in dispute. With that in mind
I will re-read question number six:
(Reading) "Without regard to any of
the previous questions and your answers
thereto, and in any event, state the
amount of damages sustained by the plaintiffs Sylvia Keller and Lottie Draper as
a result of the occurrence."
And you arrive at your answers to those
questions in the light of my general instructions on what should guide you in considering
-11-

the evidence and weighing it and instructions
numbers nine and nine A. But the jury in a
case of this sort makes no award. It does not
deny anyone an award. The Court does that under certain legal rules.
Now do you have any questions? Does
that clarify the matter?
JURY FOREMAN:
(T. 192)

That clarified it, sir.

This instruction from the Judge in effect informs the jury
what affect their answers will have on the final outcome of the
case.
This court has ruled in the case of R. William McGuinn II
and Floy W. McGuinn v. Utah Power & Light Company, 529 P.2d
423, that:
. . . it is prejudicial error if, in a comparative negligence case, the court instructs the jury as to the effect or impact
its fact-finding answers, in a special verdict, will have on the outcome of the case.
This instruction from the trial court does, in effect, inform the jury of the impact of their answers and was reversible
error.
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING THE LAST TWO PARAGRAPHS OF
INSTRUCTION NUMBER SIX.
The last two paragraphs of instruction number six read
follows:
Under the laws of this state on a multiple lane highway two single solid yellow
longitudinal lines four inches in width and
spaced in excess of two feet apart shall
constitute a distinctive roadway marlcing
to which no traffic shall travel to the left
thereon; however the use of such a distinctive roadway marking shall not be construed
to prohibit traffic movements across, and
where practical left turn movements must commence from within such a distinctive roadway
-12-

as

marking.
Failure of a driver to operate his vehicle in accordance with the foregoing requirements of law would constitute negligence on his part. (R. 83)
This is not an accurate statement of the law.

Instruction six

is not based on any statute nor any judicial interpretation of
the laws of this State.

Its origin is the following resolution

passed by the Utah State Road Commission on February 13, 1970.
Two single solid yellow-longitudinal
lines, four inched in width and spaced in
excess of two feet apart, shall constitute
a distinctive roadway marking to which no
traffic shall travel to the left thereof,
however, the use of such a distinctive roadway marking shall not be construed to prohibit traffic movements across, and where
practical, left-turn movements must commence
from within such a distinctive roadway marking. (R. 4 8) (emphasis added)
This resolution is faulty for three reasons:

(1) the resolu-

tion is confusing and unclear; (2) there has been no adequate
notice given to the public that it is law; and (3) the Road Commission went beyond its authority in passing such a resolution.

(1) The resolution is confusing and unclear.

r

The language of the resolution requires that if two yellow
longitudinal lines dividing the center of the road are any wider •
than two feet apart, left turns across them must, whenever practical, be commenced from within them.

Is it ever practical for

a motorist to commence a left turn from within lines that are
two feet apart?
four, or five?

What about lines that are three feet apart, or
How far apart must lines be before it becomes

practical for the driver of a motor vehicle to commence a left
turn from within two lines?

Certainly the driver of an automobile
-13-

cannot commence a left turn entirely within two lines that are
only two feet apart.

Should he try to commence his left turn as

much as possible from within the lines?

It is inconceivable that

the law would require a motorist to commence left turns by placing
the left two or three feet of his vehicle within two narrow lines,
yet the literal wording of the resolution appears to require it*
Thus, as the resolution stands, it is vague and unclear, and
should not be given the force of law.
The resolution is unclear for another reason.

The Road Com-

mission provides a diagram which ostensibly explains the intent
and meaning of the resolution.

The bottom third of the diagram

shows a maneuver which the diagram says is not permitted.
Diagram R. 49)

(See

The maneuver depicted is a vehicle leaving a

driveway and turning left over the two lines that constitute the
distinctive markings described in the resolution.

However, the

language of the resolution does not forbid such a maneuver.

The

language of the resolution states broadly that movement of traffic across the distinctive markings described in the resolution
are permitted.

The only restriction of movement across said mark-

ings is that when practical, left turns must commence within
the markings, as depicted at the top of the diagram.
49)

(R. 48,

This resolution clearly does not apply to a motorist leav-

ing a driveway and turning across the center lines as described
at the bottom of the diagram; for at no time is it practical or
even possible to commence a left turn within lines in the center
of the road when a motorist is making a left turn out of a driveway
and across the road.

Thus, the maneuver shown to be forbidden in

the diagram is not forbidden by the language of the resolution.
-14-

in the diagram is not forbidden by the language of the resolution.
Such vagueness and self-contradiction is unreasonable and should
not be considered law.
(2)
law.

No adequate notice has been given to the public that it is
The second reason why this resolution should not be consid-

ered law is because adequate notice has never been given that
this resolution has been passed and that it purports to be law.
The copy of the resolution was introduced into the record on the
Court's own motion.

The resolution was contained in a memorandum

sent by the Department of Public Safety to all law enforcement
officers, prosecutors and judges.

Surely a private memo to the

police, prosecutors and judges cannot constitute adequate notice
to the public.

No reference is made in the Utah Driver's Manual

to the types of traffic maneuvers mentioned in the resolution,
nor to the meaning of the distinctive highway markings described
therein.

It is doubtful that the drivers in this State are aware

that there is such a resolution, or that when they encounter the
highway markings described therein, know what they signify.

To

promote as law something as obscure as this resolution goes
against all concepts of adequate notice*
(3)

The Road Commission went beyond .its authority in passing

such a resolution.

The resolution should not be recognized as

law because the Road Commission exceeded its authority in issuing it.

The statutes that the resolution purports to modify are

§§41-6-63 and 41-6-63.10 of the U.C.A., 1953.

With regard to

these two sections, the Road Commission's authority is specifically limited to:

(1) deciding what types of highway markings will

be used to restrict vehicles from traveling to the left of the
-15-

Such vagueness and self-contradiction is unreasonable and should
not be considered law.

(2)

No adequate notice has been given to the public that it is

law.
The second reason why this resolution should not be considered law is because adequate notice has never been given that
this resolution has been passed and that it purports to be law.
The copy of the resolution was introduced into the record on the
Court f s own motion.

The resolution was contained in a memorandum

sent by the Department of Public Safety to all law enforcement
officers, prosecutors and judges.

Surely a private memo to

the police, prosecutors and judges cannot constitute adequate
notice to the public.

No reference is made in the Utah Driver 1 s

Manual to the types of traffic maneuvers mentioned in the resolution, nor to the meaning of the distinctive highway markings
described therein.

It is doubtful that the drivers in this

State are aware that there is such a resolution, or that when
they encounter the highway markings described therein, know
'what they signify.

To promote as law something as obscure

as this resolution goes against all ideas of adequate notice.

(3)

The Road Commission went beyond its authority in passing

such a resolution.
The resolution should not be recognized as law because
the Road Commission exceeded its authority in issuing it.
The statutes that the resolution purports to modify are §§416-63 and 41-6-63.10 of the U.C.A., 1953.
-16-

With regard to these

two sections, the Road Commission's authority is specifically limited to:

(1) deciding what types of highway markings

will be used to restrict vehicles from traveling to the left
of the center of the highway; and (2) deciding where to place
such markings.

The statutes never give the Road Commission

the authority to decide what type of traffic movement may be
made across such markings.

Indeed, the statute specifically

states that where there are markings of the type described
in the Commission's resolution, no traffic movements of any
kind may be made "over, upon, or across" such markings*

Thus,

the resolution is in direct contradiction to the statute it
attempts to clarify and should not be given the effect of law*
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the appellants submit that the Court erred
for the following reasons:
1/

The trial court erred in denying the appellants' motion

for a directed verdict that respondent was negligent as a matter
of law for failing to keep a proper lookout.
2.

The trial court erred in instructing the jury on sud-

den peril.
3.

The trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury

that it is not negligence as a matter of law to fail to properly
heed highway markings if they are obliterated and illegible.
4.

The trial court erred in instructing the jury of the

effect that their decision would have on the case in light of
the comparative negligence statute.
5.

The trial court erred in instructing the jury that

the resolution of the State Road Commission was, in fact, the

•' • - 1 7 -

:

law.
For the foregoing reasons, appellants request the Court to
reverse the decision of the lower court and remand the case to •
the trial court with an order requiring the trial court to enter
a directed verdict in favor of the appellants, or in the alternative, an order remanding the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
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